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Analyzing  data  from  20  OECD  countries  over  the  period  of  1995-2007,  the  present  article 
investigates whether the factors that contributed to households‘ consumption opportunities have 
had any impact on the way governments in advanced societies respond to income inequalities. In 
addressing  this  question,  the  article  particularly  focuses  on  access  to  credit,  and  low-wage 
imports, from China in particular, as two mechanisms that have contributed to an increase in 
household  consumption  opportunities.  The  results  show  a  highly  significant  inverse  relation 
between these two factors and social welfare effort. As imports from China and availability of 
credit increase, the social welfare effort seems to decrease. These findings prompt us to think 
beyond the established arguments about progressive politics in the neoliberal era. The article also 
contributes  to  the  burgeoning  literature  on  the  political  and  social  implications  of  credit 






















I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Income inequality has increased substantially in advanced nations over the past few decades, 
particularly in the liberal market economies (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Krueger and Perri 
2006; OECD 2008; Bartels 2009). For many intellectuals and policymakers this constitutes an 
inherently undemocratic trend, which needs to be countered with augmented social welfare effort 
in  the  form  of  social  spending,  and/or  progressive  taxation  (Krugman  2007;  Bartels  2009). 
Others meanwhile argue that worries about income inequality and calls for progressive politics 
remain unwarranted,  for what  matters  is  the actual material  welfare of  citizens,  which, they 
argue, has increased across the board (Slesnick 2001; Nye 2002; Wilkinson 2009). According to 
this  latter view, the increase in  consumption opportunities among middle and lower income 
households  implies  redistribution  of  living  standards,  which  in  turn  makes  redistribution  of 
income a lesser deal as a social and political objective.  
 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  not  to  normatively  engage  with  these  ideas,  which  happen  to 
animate heated debates in the worlds of scholarship, advocacy and policymaking. The goal here 
is to examine empirically whether this so-called material welfare that comes with increasing 
consumption opportunities—what one might call the ―consumer welfare‖—has any bearing on 
the governments‘ response to inequalities in income distribution. To be more precise, we would 
like to know if there is an inverse relationship between consumer welfare and social welfare 
effort. 
 
There are reasons to think that this might indeed be the case. Referring specifically to the US 
where income inequality has been especially rampant over the past few decades, Rajan (2010) 
has argued that although politicians have recognized the problem posed by rising inequality, they 
have not addressed it through social spending or taxation. Growing inequalities have rather been 4 
 
dealt  with  through  mechanisms—―easy  credit‖  in  particular—that  allowed  middle-class 
households to sustain their levels of consumption (Rajan 2010:31). Enacting real policy change 
in an area where too many vested interests favor the status quo would be hard, and would require 
years to take effect, not really resolving the electorate‘s current anxiety,‖ whereas consumption 
has  offered  a  quicker  way  to  ―mollify  the  constituents‖  (Rajan  2010:8).  In  short,  ―whether 
carefully  planned  or  an  unpremeditated  reaction  to  constituent  demands,‖  Rajan  argues,  the 
political response to rising inequality and job insecurity has been to support the mechanisms that 
would allow households to keep up their consumption (2010:8-9). 
 
One might say that this new politics shaped around consumption offered a convenient way to 
reconcile what seemed irreconcilable—that is, markets and equality. Markets seemed to bring 
individuals and households closer in consumption, even if not in income. As consumption has 
increased,  and  begun  to  follow  a  somewhat  more  equal  pattern  across  income  groups, 
inequalities in income distribution have become somewhat less conspicuous.
1 
 
To date, there has not  been an empirical analysis of whether the factors that contributed to 
increases  in  households‘  consumption  opportunities  have  had  any  bearing  on  the  way 
governments in advanced societies respond to income inequality. Analyzing data from 20 OECD 
countries over the period 1995-2007 we investigate this question. In doing so, we particularly 
focus on ―access to credit‖ and ―imports from China‖ as two mechanisms that have boosted 
citizens‘  access  to  consumption.  Is  it  possible, we  ask,  that  high  level  of  consumer  welfare 
resulting from access to credit, and access to highly affordable imported products from outside 
the OECD zone, from China in particular, has been a political substitute for social welfare effort 
                                                           
1The jury is out on the question of whether consumption inequality has actually increased, stayed stable, or 
decreased, and how much it has done so. However, there seems to be a general consensus that consumption 
inequality has remained much less pronounced than income inequality (Cutler and Katz 1992; Krueger and 
Perri 2006; Johnson, Smeeding, and Torrey, 2005; Meyer and Sullivan 2010). 5 
 
in the form of social spending and taxation? Could it be that ―redistribution of living standards‖ 
has  rendered  ―redistribution  of  income‖  less  salient  in  the  political-economic  equation  of 
advanced societies? The results of the present analysis seem to provide support for this view. 
Access  to  credit  availability  and  access  to  cheap  imports  from  China—factors  that  have 
contributed  to  expansion  in  consumption  opportunities—show  a  highly  significant  inverse 
relationship with social welfare effort, and that this holds true when controlling for a range of 
political, economic, and social variables, as well as unobservable country-specific effects. 
 
These  findings  prompt  us  to  think  anew  about  the  factors  that  shaped  the  way  progressive 
politics played out in advanced societies over the past fifteen years or so. They suggest that in the 
recent neoliberal era, politics of redistribution and welfare has had to do with consumption as 
well. What this means at the very least is that our discussions of why redistribution has been least 
available  where  and  when  it  has  been  most  needed  (Lindert  2004),  or  how  governments  in 
advanced  nations  have  actually  managed  to  undertake  retrenchment  politics  in  the  face  of 
increasing public need and demand for various redistributive and social programs, should start 
involving consumption-related factors. 
 
In what follows, we first outline the theoretical framework. The third section provides detailed 
information about the data, discusses the methodology used, and provides empirical findings. 
The  article  concludes  by  briefly  discussing  the  implications  of  the  findings  for  theory  and 
politics. 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
On  February  10,  2008  two  Federal  Reserve  economists,  Michael  Cox  and  Richard  Alm, 
published an op-ed piece in the New York Times with the title ―You are what you spend.‖ There, 
they argued that the renewed attention being given to the gap between the haves and have-nots in 6 
 
America  is  misdirected  as  it  is  focused  on  the  wrong  measurement  of  financial  well-being: 
income  statistics.  Income  statistics,  Cox  and  Alm  argued,  ―don‗t  tell  the  whole  story  of 
Americans‘ living standards.‖ A far more direct measure of American families‘ economic status, 
they argued, is household consumption, which shows that ―the gap between rich and poor is far 
less than most assume.‖ Cox and Alm were not the first to make this argument. Indeed, this 
consumption-based view of welfare had been rather popular among libertarian circles for some 
time. Irving Kristol (1997) had made a similar  point about a decade ago in the  Wall Street 
Journal in his essay ―Income Inequality without Class Conflict.‖ On the academic front Slesnick 
(2001) had argued that switching the focus to consumption trends leads to an entirely different, 
and  much  more  optimistic,  picture  of  the  growth  of  living  standards  and  the  decrease  in 
inequality and poverty in the US. More recently, the same argument that ―the dispersion of 
incomes at any given time has, at best, a tenuous connection to human welfare or social justice‖ 
was picked up by Wilkinson
2 (2009). Wilkinson argued that to get an accurate picture of overall 
material well-being, what we really should be looking at is the quantity of goods and services a 
person is able to consume, and the value to that person of all those goods and services. ―Fixating 
on income inequality,‖ he noted, ―may have caused us to miss one of the biggest stories of 
modern times: America may have become materially more equal, and no one noticed (2009:4).‖ 
 
Here,  we  coin  the  term  ―consumer  welfare‖  to  refer  to  this  view  of  wellbeing  which  takes 
material standards of living as a reference point. This is very different from social welfare, at the 
heart of which are several core principles: (1) that citizens will be insured against economic risks 
and  insecurities  (insurance);  (2)  that  there  will  be  mechanisms  in  place  to  decrease  their 
dependence on markets (decommodification); and (3) that the distance between the poor and the 
rich in a society will not get too wide (redistribution).  
                                                           
2 Will Wilkinson is the current director of the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, DC. 7 
 
As stated before, the purpose of this article is not to discuss normatively whether consumption 
could be a viable substitute for social welfare, or whether trends in consumption are what we 
have to care about rather than trends in income distribution. What this article is interested in 
investigating is a rather straightforward empirical question: are these trends related? Is there a 
relationship—an  inverse  relationship,  to  be  more  precise—between  factors  that  have  led  to 
increasing  consumption  opportunities  for  lower  and  middle  class  households  and  the  way 
governments have dealt with income inequalities? Although there is a vast literature dedicated to 
explaining why governments intervene in market-driven inequalities in such different degrees 
and ways, the questions specified in this article have not been investigated.  
 
In the existing literature, one line of thought—the power resources approach— has emphasized 
the role of labor unions and left parties in driving social welfare effort (Stephens 1979; Korpi 
1983, 1989, 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Kwon and Pontusson 2005). Another line of thought—the median voter approach— has argued 
that it is the high levels of earnings inequality that fuel demand for redistribution (Meltzer and 
Richard 1981; Perotti 1996; Milanovic 2000; Moene and Wallerstein 2001, 2003). 
3 A third line 
of  scholarship  linked  social  welfare  effort  to  economic  openness.  Scholars  who  see  this 
relationship from a compensation perspective have argued that the states redistribute wealth and 
risk so as to cushion the dislocations triggered by economic openness (Rodrik 1998; Garrett 
1998; Barr 1998, 2003). Scholars who view this relationship from an efficiency perspective on 
the other hand have argued that economic openness and social  welfare effort  are negatively 
                                                           
3 Empirical evidence does not allow for a clear consensus on this thesis. While some scholars provide evidence 
in favour of this argument (Milanovic 2000), others show that income inequality is negatively associated with 
redistributive effort: the more unequal is the primary income distribution, the less support is there for the poor 
(Moffitt et.al. 1998; Perotti 1996; Lindert 199; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). 
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associated. They have argued that competitive pressures posed by economic integration make it 
impossible to sustain social welfare effort (Huber and Stephens 2001).
 4  
 
It has also been argued that shifts in the sectoral occupational structure might trigger more social 
welfare effort on the part of the government. In this vein, Iversen and Cusack (2000) highlighted 
the  role  of  labor  market  dislocations  associated  with  deindustrialization  in  the  expansion  of 
social welfare effort in the 1960s and 1970s
5.  
 
During the last two decades, in the context of economic changes, political shifts to the right, and 
rising costs associated with demographic shifts, it has become common place to acknowledge the 
challenges that mature welfare states are facing, and the prospect for extended austerity. In this 
context, various scholars, most notably Pierson ( 1996) questioned the usefulness of   earlier 
theories that were designed to explain the expansion in social welfare effort in accounting for the 
austerity politics that contemporary welfare states remain subject to. Following Pierson‘s seminal 
work, the focus of the literature has shifted to some degree to explaining to what extent and how 
governments remain able to implement retrenchment policies that remain rather unpopular with 
the public. 
 
This article contributes new insights into these questions by examining whether those factors that 
have increased the consumption opportunities of lower income households had any bearing on 
                                                           
4 Other scholars yet take a more balanced approach (Hicks 1999; Brady 2005; Brady, Beckfield and Seelib-
Keiser 2005). Hicks (1999), for instance, argues that globalization‘s effect on welfare states is curvilinear
4, and 
Brady(2005) argues that ―globalization does not have one overall effect on the welfare state, and what effect it 
has are most certainly relatively small‖ (p.945). For further discussion see also Genschel (2002); Wibbels and 
Arce (2003); Mosley (2000); Brady, Beckfield and Zhan (2007).  
5  In deeming deindustrialization and the decline of the blue -color working class responsible for  welfare 
development, Iversen and Cusack (2000) also challenge the power resources theory, which associates welfare 
growth with the organizational or legislative strength of labor. 9 
 
the  changing  politics  of  social  welfare.  Is  it  possible  that  the  increasing  consumption 
opportunities,  by  way  of  moderating  the  effects  of  real  income  inequalities,  have  affected 
governments‘ drive to redistribute?  
 
The starting point of such an analysis must be to specify the factors that have increased lower 
and middle income households consumption capacities over the past few decades. We posit here 
that two factors
6 have been particularly operative in this regard over the past fifteen years or so: 
(1) households‘ access to credit, which has substantially increased since the early 1990s, albeit to 
different degrees in different nations; (2) households‘ access to low-wage imports from outside 
the OECD zone—notably from China, which has brought down the prices of a range of products 
that constitute a large portion of household consumption. Let me explain. 
 
ACCESS TO CREDIT 
One of the most distinct features of the last few decades of capitalist development in advanced 
countries has been the expansion in households‘ access to credit. In the US, credit had been 
central  to  the maintenance of middle-class Americans‘ living standards  since the end of the 
Second World War (Logemann 2007; Trumbull 2010). In recent decades, however, this role has 
become  even  more  pronounced.  The  socio-economic  base  of  credit  usage  has  expanded 
tremendously.
7 This recent increase in use of credit has  occurred in tandem with the increase in 
income inequality, as Krueger and Perri (2006) have shown . As different types of credit with 
varying characteristics have become available,  households, especially lower and middle-class 
                                                           
6 This is not to say that these two factors are the only ones that matter. Other scholars might suggest other 
factors  and  mechanisms  to  play  a  role  in  increasing  lower  and  middle  class  households‘  consumption 
opportunities. 
7 The widening in the socio-economic base of credit usage is often described as part of  a ―democratization of 
finance.‖ This implies that access to credit, which has been a privilege of only a certain part of the population 
(i.e., white, upper and middle classes), has now become available to a large part of the population.  10 
 
households, have increasingly turned to these financing tools to enjoy consumption opportunities 
that would have not been available otherwise (Krugman 2007). 
 
This trend of increasing credit usage has not necessarily remained an American phenomenon. As 
Rajan (2010) argues, since the early 1990s, ―easy credit‖ has emerged, in other rich countries as 
well, as a ―seductive‖ way of improving the material lives of voters whose income distribution 
was getting increasingly unequal. This has happened at varying degrees, as shown in Figure 1 
with the increase in household loans included as part of GDP across the advanced countries 
between 1995 and 2007.  
Figure 1 here 
 
Recently,  economic  sociologists  and  political  economists  have  begun  to  offer  important 
theoretical  and  empirical  insights  into  the  causes  and  implications  of  credit  use  for  socio-
economic processes. Crouch (2009), for instance, has argued that excessive credit use over the 
last two or three decades must be seen as the rise of ―privatised Keynesianism‖—a policy regime 
whereby households and individuals, rather than governments, take up debt so as to stimulate the 
economy  and  create  economic  stability.  Schwartz  and  Seabrooke  (2008)  have  talked  about 
―housing and the welfare trade off,‖ discussing how residential property ownership interacts with 
welfare regimes. Prasad (2010) in a similar framework, and taking a more historical perspective, 
asked if there is a ―credit-welfare tradeoff‖ in advanced nations. 
 
This article contributes to this recent body of work by inquiring whether credit, through its effect 
on  consumer  welfare,  has  any  implications  for  the  way  governments  dealt  with  income 
inequalities. We hypothesize that household access to credit has an inverse relationship with 
social welfare effort. 
 
Hypothesis 1: As access to credit increases, social welfare effort decreases. 11 
 
LOW-WAGE IMPORTS AND ―MADE IN CHINA‖ 
The second factor that has increased households‘ consumption opportunities, arguably, is the 
continuous decrease in price of a wide range of products that households use. It is a well-known 
argument
8 that many products that until only recently were affordable only to the mega-rich are 
now enjoyed by households even in lower -income brackets in today's advanced nations  (Nye 
2002). According to the Montgomery Ward catalog for instance, while it took 260 hours for an 
average worker to earn a one-speed bike in 1895, in 2000 it took only 7.2 hours. While buying a 
hundred-piece dinner set meant 44 hours of labor for an average worker  in 1895, in 2000 it was 
only a matter of 3.6 hours.  
 
While the downward trend in the prices of goods that make up a large portion of household 
consumption has been an ongoing trend for some time, thanks largely to technological advances, 
advanced nations  have seen an overflow in the availability of highly affordable consumer 
products in the past two decades. Recent research has noted the role of low -wage imports— 
China‘s rapid export expansion, in particular—as a major source of the decline in the aggregate 
price of trade manufactures recorded by the IMF after the mid-1990s, seen in Figure 2 (Lai 2004; 
Zhang and Kaplinsky 2006; Fu and Gong 2008; Villoria 2009; Auer et al. 2011).  
 
Thanks to its low-cost labor and sustained productivity growth, China has become the world‘s 
factory  floor.  The  share  of  advanced  country  imports  accounted  for  by  China  has  risen 
substantially over the last two decades, with particularly sharp increases since the early 1990s in 
Japan, the United States, and the European Union (Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004). As Table 1 
shows, while in 1980, China accounted for only 0.5 percent of all US imports, this number was 
up to 11 percent by 2002. In the same period China‘s share in total world exports increased 
approximately four times (Rodrik 2006).  
                                                           
8 This argument often animates discussions of poverty and inequality in libertarian circles.  12 
 
Figure 2 and Table 1 here 
 
This article posits that low-wage imports—from China, in particular—increased the affordability 
of a large range of products, increasing as a result lower and middle income households‘ access 
to consumption. The rise in the share of OECD imports accounted by low-wage countries and 
China  must  thus  be  considered  as  a  factor  which  has  moderated  the  effects  of  real  income 
inequalities.  We  posit  that  this  might  have  had  consequences  for  the  way  governments  in 
advanced nations have dealt with rising income inequalities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As countries‘ imports from low-wage countries and China increase, social welfare 
effort decreases. 
 
As briefly discussed in the preceding section, international trade-social welfare nexus has been 
studied extensively, although the impact of China, specifically, has not been addressed. Scholars 
who view this relationship from an efficiency perspective predict an inverse relationship between 
low-wage imports and social welfare effort arguing that competition from low-wage countries 
makes  it  difficult  for  nations  to  support  generous  social  policies.  Those  who  view  this 
relationship from a compensation perspective, on the other hand, predict a positive relationship 
arguing  that  low-wage  competition  undercuts  the  market  position  of  low-skilled  workers  in 
advanced countries, spurring demand for compensation. Our expectations of the direction of the 
relationship between low-wage imports and social welfare effort remain in line with the latter of 
these two approaches. Our logic of inference, however, differs. We hypothesize that low-wage 
imports  remain  inversely  related  to  social  spending  and  are  redistributive  not  because  of 
efficiency/competition reasons, but because they contribute to an increase in the consumption 
opportunities of households; as a result real income inequalities become less conspicuous, and 13 
 
the  political  consequence  of  not  responding  to  those  real  income  inequalities  becomes  less 
taxing, electorally speaking. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
For this article a panel data analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between the main 
explanatory variables of interest—namely, access to credit, and access to ―made in China‖—and 
the  dependent  variable,  social  welfare  effort.  The  analysis  involves  data  from  20  OECD 
countries for the period of 1995-2007. The units of observation of dependent and independent 
variables are the country-years.  
 
Panel  data  analysis  offers  many  well-known  benefits  for  political  economic  inquiries  of  a 
comparative nature.  Mainly, it increases the total number of observations and the degrees of 
freedom,  allowing  for  estimation  of  more  fully  specified  models,  and  makes  it  possible  to 
examine the observed variance across space and time (Plumper, Troeger and Manow 2005). On 
the other hand, it presents several statistical challenges—most notably, that of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity in the error term. Following Beck and Katz (1995), this study calculated 
panel-corrected  standard  errors  to  circumvent  the  problem  of  heteroskedasticity.  Potential 
autocorrelation problems have been addressed by allowing for an AR (1) structure in the error 
term.
9  
                                                           
9  Following Beck and Katz (1995), the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to the right side of the 
equation has become a common way of dealing with autocorrelation. We do not follow this approach here, for 
several  reasons.  First,  our  time  span  is  rather  short  (thirteen  years),  which  renders  inclusion  of  a  lagged 
dependent variable rather problematic. Second, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable runs the risk of 
suppressing the power of other independent variables. Achen (2000) and Plumper et al. (2005) discuss this 
issue extensively, demonstrating how lagged dependent variables may ―dominate a regression.‖ To avoid the 
outcome  that  a  significant  part  of  the  trend  in  the  dependent  variable  would  be  absorbed,  although  not 14 
 
To  help  isolate  the  relationship  between  the  main  explanatory  variables  and  the  dependent 
variable, this article includes in its analysis several control variables derived from the literature, 
namely: left party power, union density, elderly as a percentage of total population, economic 
openness (measured in terms of financial as well as trade openness), economic growth rate, share 
of manufacturing in total employment, rate of unemployment, budget deficit, and gross income 
inequality. This article also includes dummy variables for each of the countries in the dataset, so 
as to reduce the omitted variable bias that would occur due to unobservable country effects. 
 
The main structural equation takes the following general form:  
 
Yit =   β1CREDITit + β 2CHINAit + λZit + fi + µit 
 
In  this  equation,  Y  is  the  dependent  variable,  social  welfare  effort;  the  β‘s  are  parameter 
estimates; the subscripts i and t denote the country and year of observations; access to credit 
―CREDIT,‖ and access to Chinese imports ―CHINA‖ are the primary explanatory variables of 
interest; Zit contains the exogenous controls; fi represents country-specific fixed effects, and µ is 
the error term.  
 
Two of the variables included on the right hand side of the equation may be suspected of being 
endogenous to social spending and redistribution: budget deficit and income inequality. We do 
not believe that this poses a problem for this analysis, however. First of all, the concern in this 
article is not with accurately measuring the impact of any these factors on social welfare effort. 
These are merely control variables. Their endogeneity would only matter if they altered  the 
results,  which  is  not  the  case  here.  Moreover,  the  inequality  variable  (gross  GINI)  that  we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
explained, by the lagged dependent variable, we chose to address the potential autocorrelation problems by 
estimating a panel-specific AR (1) model. 15 
 
included in the analysis captures the distribution of market income—that is, income before taxes 
and social spending, which in effect is exogenous to both spending and redistributive effort. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Social Welfare Effort 
This study measures social welfare effort primarily in terms of social transfers as a percentage of 
GDP.  The  data  comes  from  the  widely-used  comparative  political  data  set  compiled  by 
Armingeon et al. (2010). The study uses two alternative measures. The first of these is the total 
public and mandatory private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which also comes from 
Armingeon et al. (2010). The second one is a degree of redistribution variable, calculated from 
Solt‘s (2009) gross and net GINI measures. Solt‘s gross GINI measure captures the distribution 
of  market  incomes,  whereas  the  net  GINI  measure  captures  income  distribution  after  social 
transfers and taxes. To calculate the degree of redistribution in a nation in a given year, the 
difference between gross and net GINI values is divided by gross GINI so that nations‘ actual 
redistributive efforts can be measured in proportion to the initial inequality level observed in the 
distribution of market income. 
Primary Explanatory Variables of Interest: 
Household Access to Credit 
Following Prasad (2010), this study calculated household access to credit using OECD‘s net 
lending/net  borrowing  in  the  household  sector  data  and  inverting  the  negative  and  positive 
values. This variable essentially captures households‘ credit-based net debt. As an alternative 




                                                           
10 This measure includes various forms of short-term consumer credit, including credit card debts. 16 
 
Household Access to Low-wage Imports and “Made in China” 
 This  study  measured households‘  access  to  “made in  China” products  in  terms  of China‘s 
exports to individual countries as a percentage of the importing country‘s GDP. The data comes 
from IMF‘s Direction of Trade (DOT) statistics. The study also uses the more comprehensive 
variable of low-wage imports that measures the ratio to GDP of low-wage imports to individual 
countries. The data comes from OECD‘s bilateral trade statistics. It measures imports from non-
OECD countries excluding OPEC countries and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Consumer Welfare 
Although the study  runs regressions  separately  on both  credit and China variables,  it seems 
conceptually convenient for the purposes of the present article to have an aggregated consumer 
welfare variable that measures both of these variables at the same time; so a compound consumer 
welfare variable was constructed out of these two variables. In order to do this, both variables 
were  first  converted  into  standardized  z  scores.  Then  the  average  value  was  calculated  and 




Left Party Power and Union Density 
As  discussed  before,  the  power  resources  theory  sees  social  welfare  effort  as  a  function  of 
working-class power. Thus, union density and left party power variables were included in the 






The  economic  openness  variables  also  come  from  Armingeon  et  al.  (2010).  One  of  these 
variables, kaopen, measures the extent of openness in capital account transactions, while the 
other one, openc, measures the openness of the economy in current prices, measured as total 
trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP.  
Share of Manufacturing in Total Employment 
The study includes the share of manufacturing in total employment as a control variable. This is 
for two reasons. First, the sectoral composition of the economy might matter for social welfare 
effort. Second, following Iversen and Cusack (2000), changes in the manufacturing‘s share of 
employment might play an especially important role, and must thus be controlled for.
11  
Gross GINI 
Following the median voter theory which sees social welfare effort to depend in part on the 
distribution of market incomes, an inequality variable (gross GINI) was included in the analysis. 
The data for this comes from Solt‘s (2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database. It 
measures the distribution of market income—that is, income before taxes and social transfers. 
Economic Growth, the Rate of Unemployment, Budget Deficit, and Percent Elderly 
The data on economic growth, rate of unemployment, budget deficit, and percentage of elderly in 
the total population all come from Armingeon et al. (2010). Economic growth is measured in 
terms of the growth of real GDP (percentage change from previous year). Rate of employment is 
                                                           
11 We should note that in accounting for the role of deindustrialization, Iversen and Cusack (2000) do not 
simply use data on manufacturing‘s share in total employment, as we do here. Their argument is that labor 
market dislocations associated with major shifts in the sectoral occupational structure between the 1960s and 
1990s remained a driving force in expansion of transfers and social spending. Accordingly, their measurement 
takes into account percentage of the population employed in both the agricultural and industrial sectors over all 
the active age population. Our argument, however, is not about welfare expansion in the post-1960s era, but 
about recent changes. We do not think that factors such as the drastically changing size of the agricultural labor 
force are as relevant to our time frame and question as it is to Iversen and Cusack (2000). 
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measured  as  a percentage of the civilian labor force. Budget  deficit measures annual  deficit 
(government primary balance) as a percentage of GDP. And finally, percent elderly measures 
population 65 and over as a percentage of the total population. 
 
RESULTS 
The regression results on which the present analysis rests provide Prais-Winsten coefficients 
with  panel-corrected  standard  errors.  The  findings  provide  support  for  the  two  hypotheses 
outlined  in  the  previous  pages  regarding  the  consumer  welfare-social  welfare  relationship. 
Access to credit, and access to ―made in China‖—factors that have contributed to an expansion 
in households‘ consumption opportunities—seem to have had a bearing on the politics of welfare 
and redistribution in the neoliberal era. Figure  3 provides a basic scatter plot to display the 
negative association between consumer welfare and social welfare effort. 
Figure 3 here 
Regressions  in  Table  2  examine  whether  this  relationship  holds  when  controlling  for  other 
theoretically relevant factors. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the social welfare effort 
measured in terms of social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Controlling for political 
influence variables, economic openness variables, economic growth rate, rate of unemployment, 
share  of  manufacturing  in  total  employment,  and  percent  elderly,  the  results  indicate  that 
consumer welfare displays a highly significant negative association with social welfare effort 
(p=.000). A one standard deviation increase in consumer welfare is associated with a .62 percent 
increase in the social welfare effort. In Column 2 the study includes the inequality (gross GINI) 
and deficit variables in the model. We also include dummy variables for each of the countries in 
the data set, although the study does not report the coefficient estimates for these variables. 
Country dummies account for a significant portion of the variance. After their inclusion the 
adjusted R-squared goes up by a substantial 8 percentage points. This is not surprising given the 19 
 
large importance of country-specific effects such as history and culture. Nevertheless, despite the 
strong effects of the control variables, including country-specific effects, consumer welfare still 
displays  a  highly  significant  (p=0.000)  effect  on  the  social  welfare  effort—although  its 
substantive effect decreases slightly.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
To check the stability of this finding, we re-estimate the same model using alternative measures 
of the dependent variable. In Column 3 we measure social welfare effort in terms of total public 
and  mandatory  private  social  expenditure  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  and  in  Column  4  social 
welfare effort is measured in terms of the degree of redistribution. The results reinforce the 
statistical patterns found in the previous two exercises regarding the consumer welfare-social 
welfare link. Consumer welfare displays a significant association with social expenditure as a 
percentage  of  GDP  (p=0.035)  and  redistribution  (p=0.007).  For  an  increase  of  one  standard 
deviation in consumer welfare, social expenditure increases .38 percent, and redistributive effort 
increases .72 percent. 
 
Looking across Table 2, unemployment, percent elderly, trade, and manufacturing employment 
consistently display a highly significant relationship with social welfare effort as well. The effect 
of manufacturing employment on social welfare effort seems to be negative. This is in line with 
the  predictions  of  Iversen  and  Cusack  (2000).  The  effect  of  trade  on  social  welfare  effort 
consistently turns up highly significant as well. The direction of the relationship here is in line 
with the efficiency thesis, which expects to see a negative relationship.   
 
Table 3 indicates whether the two main explanatory variables of interest—namely, households‘ 
access to credit and households‘ access to low-wage imports—have any effect on social welfare 20 
 
effort.  In Column 1 we examine this question including the full set of control variables but 
excluding  the  country  fixed-effects.  The  dependent  variable  is  measured  in  terms  of  social 
security transfers as a percentage of GDP. If Hypothesis 1 holds, then it follows that access to 
credit has a negative effect on the social welfare effort. Likewise, if Hypothesis 2 holds, then it 
follows that access to ―made in China‖ has a negative effect on the social welfare effort. This is 
indeed the case. Both variables display a significant negative association with the social welfare 
effort at p=0.04 and p=0.002 levels respectively.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
In Column 2 we re-estimate the same model, this time including the country-specific effects. 
Access to ―made in China‖ still displays a highly significant relationship with the social welfare 
effort at p=0.003 level. The effect of access to credit on social welfare effort, however, seems to 
have diminished somewhat after the inclusion of country-specific effects (p=0.059).  
 
In Column 3, we re-estimate the same model replacing the access to ―made in China‖ variable 
with access to low-wage imports. A highly significant negative relationship appears between 
low-wage imports and social welfare effort; but the effect of low-wage imports is not quite as 
strong as the effect of the access to ―made in China‖ variable. This is not entirely surprising. 
Other research has shown that not  all low-wage imports have the same effect.  Auer (2010) 
shows, for instance, that low-wage competition has strong price effects, but this is largely driven 
by Chinese exports. According to Auer (2010) when Chinese exporters capture 1% of European 
market share, producer prices decrease about 2%, whereas no such effect is present for import 
competition from low-wage countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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In  Column  4  we  replace  the  access  to  credit  variable  with  short-term  credit—that  includes 
household loans up to one year. Consistent with the previous results, short-term credit has a 
negative  relationship  with  social  welfare  effort;  however,  the  statistical  effect  is  borderline 
significant with p=0.098.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
As Pierson (1996) and Brady et al. (2005) note, the causal factors that shaped social welfare 
politics earlier—most notably in the period of welfare expansion after the Second World War—
cannot  be  expected  to  fully  explain  social  welfare  politics  today.  To  make  sense  of  the 
contemporary politics of social welfare, it is important to take into account the factors that have 
drastically changed the way capitalist economies function in more recent periods. By examining 
the welfare and redistributive effects of credit expansion and China‘s export-oriented growth, 
this article has made an attempt in that direction. It has offered a new way of thinking about 
social  welfare  politics  that  go  beyond  the  existing  arguments  about  the  strength  of  social 
democratic  parties,  median  voter  preferences,  demographic  challenges,  or  globalization 
variables.   
 
Looking into the linkages between consumer welfare and social welfare effort, which might not 
appear so intuitive at first, may help to shed new light on some of the prevailing puzzles in 
political science. Why has social welfare effort remained the least in places where it has been 
needed the most over the last few decades? Why is it that despite rampant inequalities in the US 
over the past twenty years, there has not been a decisive attempt to counter these trends through 
spending and taxation, and why has public support for such policies remained rather limited still? 
The investigation of 20 OECD countries from 1995 to 2007 suggests that the answer to these 
questions might have something to do with consumption patterns.  
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This analysis has shown that consumer welfare is inversely related to social welfare effort, and 
that  this  relationship  holds  true  when  controlling  for  a  variety  of  factors  including  country-
specific effects. Our interpretation of these results is that those factors, such as access to credit 
and  low-wage  imports,  which  allowed  lower  and  middle-class  households  to  keep  up  their 
consumption,  in  other  words,  material  welfare,  might  have  lessened  the  salience  of  the 
increasingly stagnant paychecks and economic insecurities, and diminish the political urgency 
for policymakers to respond to them. 
 
The suggestion here is not that these factors have actually decreased the relevance of the income 
inequality question in rich societies. This argument, which has been made time and again by 
libertarian economists and neoliberal politicians, sees inequality, as Crouch (2011) notes, only in 
terms of consumption and ignores the long-term consequences of widening income disparities 
for democracy, social trust, and power dynamics in society. It also obliterates the role of state 
intervention in dealing with these socio-economic issues. However, instead of discussing the 
inherent problems of this argument, the article focuses on observable effects. It argues that in 
order to make sense of contemporary politics of social welfare—to explain, for instance, how it 
is  that  in  the  face  of  rising  inequalities,  social  welfare  effort  has  remained  stagnant,  if  not 
declined, in most advanced societies—it is necessary to look into consumption also. 
 
Admittedly, the article fails to provide a full account of the consumer welfare / social welfare 
nexus.  What  exactly  is  the  mechanism  here,  one  might  legitimately  ask.  While  we  are  not 
pursuing  this  question  empirically  in  this  article,  we  argue  that  there  are  two  possible 
mechanisms in place linking consumption and social welfare.  
First,  it  might  be  that  policymakers  in  advanced  countries  have  increasingly  embraced,  in 
different degrees, this particular view of social welfare, which sees inequality merely as a matter 
of consumption. In other words, in the past decade or so policymakers might have come to 23 
 
believe that in the rich societies which they govern, income disparities do not matter anymore 
because the great majority is materially well off. Crouch (2011) notes, for instance, that previous 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair held this view, and expressed it frequently.  
 
Another possible mechanism might be the changing attitudes to inequality among the electorate. 
The increase in household consumption opportunities, due to factors such as increasing access to 
credit  and  to  products  ―made  in  China,‖  might  have  had  an  impact  on  how  individuals 
themselves view questions of inequality and social welfare, and this in turn might have affected 
societal demand for social welfare effort.  Although the space and data limitations of this article 
do not allow an examination of these specific underlying mechanisms, it is important to note that 
such mechanisms might be operative. 
 
Although this analysis has been limited to explaining politics of social welfare in the neoliberal 
era, the findings suggest revisiting existing knowledge of the historical development of welfare 
systems, and their categorical differences as they are described in the ―three worlds of welfare 
capitalism‖ thesis. In these comparative models, the US, along with several other liberal market 
economies, is depicted as a residual welfare state that does relatively so little by way of social 
security provision, redistribution and decommodification. This characterization stands accurate 
on many accounts. In terms of social spending as a percentage of GDP, the American welfare 
state happens to be smaller by comparison to the other advanced countries. Various surveys 
about people‘s attitudes towards welfare have also shown that Americans are much less willing 
to redistribute from the rich to the poor than Europeans. Nevertheless, the differences between 
welfare  regimes  might  be  running  deeper  than  this  characterization  suggests.  From  its  early 
origins onwards, the exceptionalism of the American welfare state lay not simply in its meager 
spending in comparison to other advanced nations but in the fact that redistribution of living 
standards rather than redistribution of income has remained its main organizing logic. It might 
make more sense, therefore, to characterize the American welfare regime as a consumer welfare 24 
 
regime, rather than a residual social welfare regime. The early development of the credit system 
in the US and its role in creating material affluence for working citizens must be considered 
carefully vis-à-vis the un-development of generous social welfare policy. Several scholars have 
already started to contribute to our comparative understandings of social welfare regimes along 
these lines (Logemann 2007; Trumbull 2010; Prasad 2010). This is all to say that at the very 
least, we should think more closely about the historical linkages between the political economy 
of consumption and political economy of social welfare. 
 
Finally, a few words must be said about the ―made in China‖ effect found here. There is an 
interesting  literature  developing  around  the  question  of  China‘s  influence  on  the  political 
economy of advanced and developing countries. A part of this literature established that China 
has played an important role in bringing consumer prices down in OECD countries. This article 
expanded  on  this  scholarship.  We  argued  that  China  has  increased  households‘  access  to 
affordable products, albeit in different degrees in different nations depending on the level of 
trade, and this has had consequences for social welfare politics,. More specifically, by making it 
possible for lower and middle class households to continue having access to a large range of 
products despite their shrinking returns from the labor market, China helped moderate the effects 
of real income inequalities. What this means is that China‘s export-oriented growth might have 
indirectly been one of the reasons why governments in advanced nations could actually avoid 
dealing with rising inequalities through social spending and/or taxation. Indeed, the effect of 
China is likely to stretch further, given that China today is the biggest financier of debt in many 
advanced nations, most prominently the US. This is to say that China is not only one of the chief 
suppliers of affordable products to advanced nations but also one of the chief suppliers of credit. 
Without the significant rise of China as an economic power over the past fifteen years or so, this 
political-economic tradeoff between consumption and redistribution, between consumer welfare 
and social welfare, which we have discussed here, might not have been possible at all. More 
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Table-1: Chinese Exports Markets Shares in Major Markets 
      1980    1990    2000    2002 
Japan     3.1    5.1    14.5    18.3 
USA      0.5    3.2    8.6    11.1 
EU      0.7    2.0    6.2    7.5 
 




















Figure-2: World Manufacturing Export Price Change (1986-2003) 
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Table 2- Regression Estimates: Consumer Welfare and Social Welfare Effort  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
























































































R-Squared  .890  .972  .981  .965 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
Country dummies are included in models 2, 3 and 4 although results are not shown. 
The dependent variable is social welfare effort. 
In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is measured in terms of social security transfers as a % 
of GDP.  
In model 3, the dependent variable is measured in terms of total social expenditure as a % of 
GDP.  





Table 3- Regression Estimates: Credit, China and Social Welfare Effort 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 





(.032)   
China  -.465*** 
(.153) 
-.380*** 
(.128)    -.390*** 
(.152) 
Low-wage imports      -.059*** 
(.021)   
Short-term loans        -.060* 
(.036) 




















































































R-Squared  .895  .972  .971  .965 
 